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BANK-SPONSORED INVESTMENT SERVICES:
STATUTORY PROSCRIPTIONS, JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS,
AND A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
I think the time has come to ask whether the fears- and resulting
barriers - of 40 years ago are the same concerns that should rule us now,
or whether, in view of the extensive securities industry supervisory structure and greatly strengthened bank regulatory structure which now
exists, a greater role for banks in the matter of broadening participation
in our equities markets should now be permitted.'
- Jeffrey M. Bucher, Member, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, November 21, 1974
I know of no responsible person in the securities industry who thinks
that we can survive for long as an independent industry either as investment bankers or as brokers if the commercial banks are permitted
to continue to compete against us
-

....

2

John C. Whitehead, Chairman, Securities
Industry Association, May 29, 1974

The quotations set forth above illustrate polar positions in a long-running
struggle between two of the nation's principal suppliers of capital over the extent to which commercial banks may provide their customers with investment
services long considered the exclusive province of broker-dealers and investment bankers. As the banks continue to prosecute their offensive on a number
of fronts, each vigorously contested by the securities industry, it appears increasingly unlikely that the conflict can be resolved without the necessity of
congressional action. Legislative intervention is required, not only to arbitrate
between two powerful sectors of the American financial community, but also
to end serious jurisdictional squabbling between the federal bank regulatory
agencies3 and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Each claims, predictably, that it is, or should be, the proper regulatory authority in matters
relating to banks' securities activities. As an indication of its determination to
resist what it considers jurisdictional interloping by the bank regulators, the
SEC last year called for comments 4 on the entire spectrum of issues involving
banks and the securities business, even those over which it had previously disclaimed any authority.5 As a result of its study, the SEC will probably take
1. 279 BNA SEc. REG. L. REP. A-15, A-16 (1974).
2. 259 BNA SEc. REG. L. REP. F-1, F-2 (1974).
3. Responsibility for bank supervision is divided among three federal regulatory authorities: The Comptroller of the Currency for national banks, 12 U.S.C. §§I et seq. (1970); the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for member banks and bank holding
companies and their affiliates, 12 U.S.C. §§241 et seq., §§1841 et seq. (1970); and the Board
of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for insured nonmember state
banks, 12 U.S.C. §§264 et seq. (1970).
4. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5491 (April 30, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 18,163 (1974).
5. The SEC has repeatedly disclaimed jurisdiction over questions arising under the
Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act, 98 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.)). SEC Securities Act Release No. 5491 (April 10, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 18,163. Letter from
William L. Cary, Chairman, SEC, to the Secretary of the Treasury, Feb. 7, 1963, reprinted in
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further steps to bring these banking activities within its regulatory ambit,
either through promulgation of administrative regulations, proposals for
legislation, or both.6 The conflict has spread to the judicial branch as well.
Presently pending in federal district court are two suits brought by securities
industry interest groups to force banks to abandon two of their most important investment services, the operation of automatic monthly investment
plans 7 and the advising of investment companies. 8 Moreover, it is likely that
any administrative action by the SEC aimed at bringing banking activities
within its purview will engender- still more litigation as banks seek to avoid
what they consider redundant or unnecessarily burdensome regulation.
An understanding of the issues involved in the controversies between the
banks and the securities industry and between the bank regulators and the
SEC requires an analysis not only of the historical forces that led to the legislatively mandated divorce of comimercial and investment banking four decades
ago, but also of the technological and economic forces that are today driving
them back iogether. Accordingly, this note first examines the origins of the
investment services issues facing policymakers today, focusing particularly on
the Banking Act of 19331 (the Glass-Steagall Act), by which the commercialinvestment banking separation was effected. Following this historical introduction, a description of the various investment services presently being offered
by banks is presented, along with an appraisal of their legality under the
Glass-Steagall Act and their desirability in light of the abuses the Act was
designed to remedy. Finally, the issue of "equal regulation" of bank-sponsored
investment services is treated, and a model for possible legislative resolution of
this jurisdictional dispute is suggested.
BANKING PRACTICES PRIOR TO THE GLAss-STEAGALL

ACr

Traditionally, the primary investment function of American commercial
banking has been to supply relatively short-term capital in the form of wellHearings on Common Trust Funds- Overlapping Responsibility and Conflict in Regulation
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 136 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Common Trust Funds Hearings]; Letter from William L. Cary, Chairman, SEC, to Reese H. Harris, March 7, 1963, reprinted in Common Trust Funds Hearings
at 161.
6. Several Commisioners have indicated obliquely that the SEC is likely to move toward
greater regulation of these banking activities. See, e.g., Evans, Regulation of Bank Securities
Activities, 91 BANKING L.J. 611, 619 (1974); Address by Ray Garrett, Jr., Chairman, SEC, The
SEC's Concern with Bank Trust Activities, before the National Trust Conference, San
Francisco, Cal., Feb. 4, 1974, reported in CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 879,641, at 83,710 (1974).
7. New York Stock Exch. v. Smith, CCH FED. SEC. L. Rav. 894,798 (D.D.C., complaint
filed Sept. 24, 1974).

8. Investment Co. Institute (ICI) v. Board of Governors, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 8f94,540
(D.D.C., complaint filed May 8, 1974). Discussion of these new investment services begins in
text accompanying note 85 infra.
9.

Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162. Relevant sections of the Glass-Steagall Act

are: §16, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §24, 7 (1970); §20, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §377 (1970); §21,
12 U.S.C. §378 (1970); §5, 12 U.SC. §335 (1970); §32, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §78 (1970). See
text accompanying notes 51-56 infra.
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secured loans to businessmen, farmers, and consumers. In addition, banks have
long been able to invest in low-risk debt securities, particularly government
issues.1° Such conservative and highly liquid investments were, of course,
logically mandated for institutions capitalized largely by debt in the form of
highly volatile demand deposits. The National Bank Act of 1864," which
established the present system of nationally chartered banks, did not expressly
prohibit national banks from dealing in corporate stocks, but such a proscription was inferred by the courts from the failure of Congress to grant the
power. 1 2 In addition to their lending functions, commercial banks in this
country have long served as corporate trustees, a role permitted national banks
by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.1" Even to a greater degree than the commercial side, the trust department of a bank was severely circumscribed in the
kinds of uses to which it could put funds held in its fiduciary capacity. "Legal
lists" of approved investments were common devices 1' for insuring the fulfillment of the trustee's primary duty - the conservation of principal. 5 Even
those states that did not require investments to be made in accordance with a
"legal list" held fiduciaries to a strict "prudent man" rule, which was frequently interpreted to forbid investment in common stock of corporate issuers.' 6 Of course, no trustee could invest in new and untested commercial
7
ventures.'
Although most possessed a deserved reputation for financial conservatism,
a few influential bankers in the second decade of the twentieth century began
to engage in activities that later were found to have contributed to the
severity and persistence of the Great Depression. These activities involved the
creation of securities affiliates by several large banks.' 8 These affiliates, whose
only purpose was to circumvent prohibitions against banks dealing in stocks,
were masterful, if dubiously legal, instruments for doing indirectly what could
not be done directly. The most notorious example of the national bank securities affiliates was National City Company, formed in 1911, which became
the largest such affiliate in the nation. The company was wholly owned by the
shareholders of National City Bank, then, as now, the country's second largest
commercial bank. 9 The bank's shareholders exercised control of the company
10. See, e.g., Junction City N. Central Nat'l Bank, 96 Kan. 407, 153 P. 28 (1915) (upholding power of national bank to purchase municipal bonds).
11. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99, 12 U.S.C. §§I et seq. (1970).
12. First Nat'l Bank v. National Exch. Bank, 92 U.S. 122 (1875).
13. Federal Reserve Act §11(k), Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251, 262, 12 U.S.C.
§248(k) (repealed 1962) conferred authority on the Federal Reserve Board to grant permits
allowing national banks to act as trustee, executor, administrator, or registrar of stocks and
bonds when not in contravention of state or local law. Identical power now resides in the
Comptroller, 12 U.S.C. §92a (1970). See text accompanying note 64 infra.
14.

G. BOGERT, THE LAW

OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

§613 (2d ed. 1960).

15. See A. ScoT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §227, at 1806 (3d ed. 1967).
16. G. BOCERT, supra note 14, §679.
17. A. ScoTr, Supra note 15, 1227.6, at 1816.
18. For a comprehensive discussion of the history, structures, and functions of these
affiliates, see W. Peach, The Security Affiliate so! National Banks, in 48 JOHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE pt. 3 (1941).

19. National City Bank is now First National City Bank as the result of its merger with
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through a voting trust, which held legal title.20 Shares in the company and
shares in the bank could not be traded separately and, in fact, their certificates
were printed on reverse sides of the same sheet of paper. 21 Most importantly,
this state-chartered alter ego was not a bank and thus was not subject to either
state or federal supervision. Powerful political considerations prevented any
legal challenge to the growing affiliate system even though the Comptroller
of the Currency noted as early as 1920:
Some "securities companies" operating in close connection with and
often officered by the same men who manage the national banks with
which they are allied, have become instruments of speculation
and head22
quarters for promotion of all kinds of financial schemes.
Not surprisingly, the abuses outlined by the Comptroller became more the
rule than the exception as formerly staid bankers clamored for their shares of
huge profits to be had during the speculative years 1928-1929.23 Some of the
most egregious examples of abuses involving banks' securities affiliates were:
(1) The making of unsound loans by the bank to its affiliate for promotion and underwriting ventures or to individuals for the purpose of financing securities purchased from the affiliate. The identity of ownership and
control between the bank and its affiliate effectively removed the protection
afforded by arm's-length negotiations, during which ordinary loan applications are scrutinized as to
the credit-worthiness of the borrower and the
24
solidarity of his collateral.
(2) The use of the securities affiliate as a burial ground for bad loans
made by the bank. National City Bank, for example, rid itself of $25 million in worthless loans to Cuban sugar companies by having the National
City Company purchase all of the shares of a newly-formed dummy corporation that, in turn, bought the bad loans from the bank.25 This disappearing
act was financed by selling $50 million in stock, divided evenly between the
bank and the company, to unsuspecting bank shareholders. Since the burying of bad loans had a beneficial effect on the financial position of the bank,
and the affiliate was not subject to regulatory supervision, bank examinations were ineffectual in discovering the abuse.
First National Bank of New York. The Bank of America is the nation's largest commercial
bank. FORTNE, July 1974, at 114.
20. Testimony of Charles E. Mitchell, Hearings on Stock Exchange PracticesBefore the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 1780 (1933) [hereinafter cited

as Stock Exchange Practices].
21. F. PacoRA, WALL STREEr UNDER OATH 79 (1939).
22. COMMOx OLER OF THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 55 (1920).
23. The number of securities affiliates of national banks eventually grew to nearly 200.
J. GOODBAR, MANAGING THE PEOPLS'S MONEY 127 (1935). "Starting with the issue of bonds as
their major activity, the affiliates had gradually passed ... to the financing and issuing of
preferred stock, and then to the issuing and financing of common stock. From such activities
they had then passed to stock market operations .... " H. WILLIs & J. CHAPMAN, THE BANKING SrrUATION 67 (1934). "[B]y 1930 [securities affiliates] were sponsoring 54.4 per cent of all
new securities issues." S. KENNEDY, THE BANKING CRISIS OF 1933, at 212 (1973).
24. See J. GoODDAR, supra note 23, at 128.
25. Testimony of Charles E. Mitchell, Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 20, at
1827-39.
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(3) The payment of exorbitant management fees that, in the case of
National City Company, totaled twenty per cent of net operating profit 26
(4) The use of the affiliated company to support the price of the bank's
own stock. This tactic27was a major contributor to the failure in 1930 of the
Bank of United States.
(5) The utilization of the affiliate to control investment trusts, one of
the preeminent engines of speculation in the late twenties. Essentially a
closed-end mutual fund,28 the investment trust was an ideal vehicle for
"leveraging" the investor's dollar 9 To support the dizzying ascent in the
price 30 of these trusts, banks were under almost irresistible pressure to provide call loan funds 31 to finance the security affiliate's margin accounts in
the trusts' shares. Of course, the same laws of leverage that had propelled
investment trust shares to such heights so quickly were also responsible for
their equally precipitous fall. 32 The crash humbled not only investors and
the trusts they owned, but also the investment affiliates and associated
banks, which had lately been so eager to insure financing of the most
speculative issues. The skewed parabola described by call money rates in
26. In 1928 Charles E. Mitchell, President of National City Bank, received as his share
of this "management fund" S750,000 from National City Company alone. This figure was 30
times his annual salary as president of the bank. Id. at 1773.
27. The Bank of United States (BUS), a state-chartered institution, had created three
securities affiliates, which had in turn purchased a large number of BUS shares. In 1928 an
exchange merger was effected between BUS and another New York bank. The recipients of
the exchanged BUS shares, however, began to "dump" them on the market, threatening to
depress the price of the stock. To avoid a price decline, the affiliates purchased more BUS
shares in the open market. Unable to resell these shares at satisfactory prices, the affiliates
were left holding a huge portfolio of BUS shares, which they could not sell without completely destroying the market and realizing a sizable loss. The bank was in a similar predicament, having $12 million outstanding in loans to affiliates, secured by its own frozen
stock. These and other questionable practices led to the collapse of BUS in 1930, at that
time the largest such failure in American history. See J. GOODBAR, supra note 23, at 130-35;
S. KENNEDY, supra note 23, at 1-3.
28. A closed-end fund is negatively defined as a management company other than one
"which is offering for sale or has outstanding any redeemable security of which it is the
issuer." Investment Company Act of 1940, §5(a), 15 U.S.C. §80a-5(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
Shares of closed-end funds are traded in the secondary markets and may sell at a premium
or discount from the prorated net asset value of the fund's portfolio. Open-end funds
("mutual funds") typically issue and redeem shares constantly at a price that represents the
shares' prorata portion of net asset value.
29. Leverage exists whenever the owner of variable-return capital can utilize capital
contributed for a fixed return. A common example is the margin account, in which the
investor borrows part of the pri(e of stock from his broker at a fixed rate. The speculative
dangers of excessive margin lending led to inclusion in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
of a provision allowing the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to set margin
limitations. 15 U.S.C. §78(g) (1970).
30. Investment trusts in 1928-1929 sold at a considerable premium over net asset value,
presumably because of investor faith in the expertise of trust management. To fuel this
faith, the trusts actively recruited luminaries from the fields of economics and finance for
their boards of directors. J. GALBRIrrH, THE GREAT CRmsH 56 (1955).
31. By 1929 many nonbanking corporations were providing call loans to brokers. These
loans often yielded a considerably higher return than did more traditional uses of corporate

funds. S. KENNEDY, supra note 23, at 14.
32. The same principle of leverage also works to the disadvantage of the variablereturn security holder in a declining profits or price situation. The greater the leverage the
sharper the decline.
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the period 1928-1930 illustrates the dramatic rise and even more dramatic
fall in securities speculation. 3 In late March of 1928, the call money rate
on new loans to members of the New York Stock Exchange was five per cent
per annum.3 ' One year later, the rate had soared to twenty per cent.3 5
Twelve months after the crash, call loans were commanding a mere two
per cent.36 Total loans to members of the Exchange rose from $3.9 billion
in October 1927 to a record $8.5 billion two years later37 Inevitably, but for
reasons still not fully understood, the great price pyramids built of borrowed money tumbled in late October 1929. Worse, the New York bankers
were unable to reverse the decline as they had done during a similar break
the previous spring.38 As speculators faced the prospect of being "sold out"
by their creditor brokers, they were forced to sell their solid holdings in
order to meet margin calls on their leveraged investment trusts and other
speculative issues, which were fast approaching worthlessness. Thus, the
collapse of the rotten issues carried with it many substantial, nonspeculative
stocks.39
TiHE GL SS-STEAGALL Acr

In 1932 the Senate authorized an investigation into practices that were
believed to have caused the crash and subsequent depression.' 0 The committee appointed to examine these practices soon came to be known as the Pecora
Committee after its chief counsel, Ferdinand Pecora, a thorough and relentless
reformer. That same year Senator Glass of Virginia introduced a bill embracing a congeries of banking reforms.' 1 Unfortunately, his proposals made little
headway against the opposition of the banking interests,' 2 the Hoover Ad-

33. Call money rates, margin percentages, and other measures of lending activity in the
securities markets are valuable indicators of the degree of speculation obtaining at a particular time.
34.

Nav YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, YEAR BOOK 1930-1931, at 96 (1931).

35. Id. at 97.
36. Id. at 98.
37. Id. at 111, 115.
38. National City Bank and other large New York City banks, whose officers dominated
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, had prevented a threatened crash early in 1929 by
providing the market with a stimulating infusion of new call money. J. GALBRAITH, supra
note 30, at 41-43. In October, however, the banks were unable to stem the deflationary tide.
Worse still, there is evidence that rescuing the market was in conflict with some bankers'
personal pecuniary interests. The president of Chase National Bank, for example, actually
profited from the crash by maintaining a short position in the shares of his own bank.
F. PECORA, supra note 21, at 153-54.
39. J. GALBRArrH, supra note 30, at 128-29.
40. S. Res. 84, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1932).
41. S. 3215, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932). The Glass Bill was the product of hearings held
in 1930-1931 on the need for reform in American banking regulation. The major provisions
of the bill as revised were: (1) restrictions on bank loans upon securities, (2) strengthening
of Federal Reserve control over bank lending activities, (3) guaranty of bank deposits, (4)
severance of commercial banks from their securities affiliates, (5) restrictions on time deposits, (6) restrictions on bank holding companies, and (7) liberalization of branch banking
-for national banks. S. 4115, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. (1933). See H; WILLIS & J. CHAPMAN, supra
note 23, at 62-83.
42. H. WILLIS & J. CHAPMAN, supra note 23, at 87.
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ministration43 and, later, President-elect Roosevelt. 44 In early 1933, however, a
combination of factors joined to propel the Glass bill rapidly toward passage.
In February the sudden collapse of a large number of banks ended any hope
that the depression was abating. 45 Although psychologically devastating, the
banking crisis had the salutary effect of persuading Roosevelt to drop his opposition to the banking reform represented by the Glass bill. 4" The most important impetus to the bill, however, was provided by the public's reaction to
the Pecora hearings, which had become a collective mea culpa of once powerful and respected New York bankers.4 7 Public outrage reached its peak in
February and March of 1933 as Charles Mitchell, president of National City
Bank, spread before the committee tales of National City Company's sordid
financial machinations. 4 These revelations, superimposed upon news of nationwide bank failures, insured that mere regulation of banks' investment activities would no longer suffice. A complete divorce of commercial from in9
vestment banking activities was demanded by the public.4
The Banking Act of 1933, popularly known as the Glass-Steagall Act,50 provided for separation in several ways. Section 16 of the Act forbade national
banks to purchase, sell, or underwrite corporate securities except "upon the
order, and for the account of, customers .... "51 The exception was made to
allow banks to continue offering "managing agency" services to their depositors.52 Section 5(c) of the Act made the provisions of section 16 applicable
43. Id. at 86.
44. Id. at 100. President Roosevelt's principal objection to the bill concerned the deposit guaranty provision. S. KENNFDY, supra note 23, at 214-15.
45. Between February 14 and March 3 banking holidays or other restrictions on deposit
withdrawal went into effect in 18 states. On March 4 the New York and Illinois banks, the
securities exchanges, and the Federal Reserve banks closed. On March 5, the day after his
inauguration, President Roosevelt. declared a four-day national banking holiday. J. BoGEN &
M'. NADLER, THE BANKING CRISIS 201 (1933).
46. S. KENNEDY, supra note 23, at 220. Despite his earlier hostility to the Glass Bill,
President Roosevelt announced upon signing the Banking Act that it was the best banking
legislation since the passage of the Federal Reserve Act twenty years earlier. H. WIt.Ls &
J. CHAPMAN, supra note 23, at 102. See Note, The Banking Act of 1933 in Operation, 33
COLUM. L. REv. 697, 698 (1935).
47. S.KENNEDY, supra note 23, at 103.
48. See text accompanying notes 24-39 supra.
49. The committee that drafted the Glass Bill had originally proposed to subject bank
securities affiliates to federal supervision and to regulate their relations with the parent banks.
Mail from irate citizens, however, demanded "absolute elimination of the affiliate system root and branch - from the national banking and Federal Reserve system." H. WILLIS &
J. CHAPMAN, supra note 23, at 68-69.
50. Carter Glass of Virginia and Henry B. Steagall of Alabama were the Act's sponsors
in the Senate and House respectively.
51. 12 U.S.C. §24, para.seventh (1970).
52. A managing agency account is a type of fiduciary service in which the bank provides investment management to a customer. The managing agency relationship may be
nondiscretionary (the bank provides only advice to the customer) or discretionary (the bank
possesses a power of attorney authorizing it to execute transactions in the customer's behalf).
E. MCINNIs, TRUST FUNCTIONS AND SERVIcES 210-15, 243-46 (1971). Section 16 of the GlassSteagall Act was amended in 1935 to make clear that Congress did not intend to prohibit
managing agency relationships. Act of Aug. 23, 1935, §308, ch. 614, 49 Stat. 709, 12 U.S.C. §24,
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to state bank members of the Federal Reserve System.53 Section 21 prohibited
any person or firm engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or
distributing securities from engaging simultaneously in the business of receiving deposits.54 Section 20 made it unlawful for any member bank to be affiliated with any organization engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution of securities. 5 Interlocking directorates
between securities companies and banks were proscribed by section 32, which
prohibited a person primarily engaged in the business of dealing in securities
from serving at the same time as an officer, director, or employee of any member bank.5 6 Radical as the Act's surgery was, it met little opposition since most
of the commercial banks affected were already in the process of divesting
themselves of their investment banking affiliates. 57 Concerned as they were with
rebuilding their tarnished image as the conservative bulwark of the American
financial community, bankers, for the most part, had little desire to remain
in the securities business.

Tim

RENEWAL OF INTEREST IN INVESTMENT SERVICES

For thirty years following passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, a chastened
banking industry was more than content with its truncated functions of shortterm lending, receiving deposits, and administering trusts. One of the few in-

novations of the period was the development of the common trust fund, a device for taking advantage of economies of scale in the management of trust investments. Forbidden at common law in the absence of express authority in the
trust instrument,58 the commingling of trust corpora makes available to small
accounts many of the benefits previously offered only to large trusts, such as
high-quality portfolio management, diversification, lower brokerage commissions, and participation in private placements.59 Although common trust funds
were established as early as 1927, they were not used extensively until 1936
when Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code to provide for passthrough treatment of common trust funds held by a bank in its capacity as
para. seventh (1970). The committees, in reporting the 1935 amendments, emphasized that
"since buying and selling for the account of a customer does not involve investment by the
bank of its own funds ...no objection can be seen thereto." H.R. REP. No. 1948, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1934); S. REP. No. 1260, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
53. 12 U.S.C. §335 (1970).
54. 12 U.S.C. §378 (1970).
55. 12 U.S.C. §377 (1970).
56. 12 U.S.C. §78 (1970).
57. See Note, supra note 46, at 703.
58. See SEC, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES, COMMINGLED OR COMMON
TRUST FUNDS ADMmisrEEm BY BANKS AND TRUST COMPANIES, H.R. Doc. No. 476, 76th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5 (1939); G. BOGERT, supra note 14, §677.
59. Pitts, Un-Common Trust Funds, 112 TRuSTs & ESTATES 634, 635 (1973). Effective May
1, 1975, stock exchanges were prohibited from adopting or retaining rules requiring their

members to charge fixed commission rates. SEC RULE 19b-3, CCH FED. SEC. L. RE'. 180,067
(1975). Although the introduction of rate competition may lower the cost of transactions for
the small investor, he will still be at a disadvantage relative to the institutions whose volume
of trading gives them a superior negotiating position.
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trustee, executor, administrator, or guardian.6 o To be eligible for pass-through
treatment, however, all funds must meet standards set for national banks.61
In 1937 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board)
amended its trust department regulations ("Regulation F") to include rules
for common trust funds, one of which was that the funds must be composed
62
exclusively of individual trust accounts held for a "true fiduciary purpose."
After three decades of relative quiescence, a new period of aggressive bank
expansionism was inaugurated in 1961 by the appointment of James J. Saxon
as Comptroller of the Currency. 63 In 1962 Congress shifted authority over
national bank trust activities from the Board to the Comptroller, 64 who used
his new powers to launch banking into the previously exclusive preserve of
the securities industry. This move was accomplished by deleting the "true
fiduciary purpose" limitation in Regulation F, which had become Regulation
9 in the Comptroller's nomenclature.65 In addition, the Comptroller expressly
provided for the operation of a commingled managing agency account, 66
whereby customers of a national bank could have their agency accounts collectively invested in a common fund managed by the trust department. 67 In
effect, a bank could sponsor an investment vehicle that was difficult to distinguish in operation from an ordinary no-load mutual fund.68 The banking
interests and the Comptroller, however, insisted that this commingled investment fund (CIF) was merely the combination of two recognized services of a
69
commercial bank: the common trust fund and the managing agency account.
Opposition to the CIF came from two sources: the securities industry,
threatened by competition [or the then-booming mutual fund business, and
the SEC, which insisted that the operation of the CIF would violate the
registration requirements of the Securities Act of 193370 and the Investment
Company Act of

1940.71

The SEC's position was that participations in the CIF

were securities 72 and that the CIF itself did not fit within the Investment
60. Revenue Act of 1936, §169, 49 Stat. 1708 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §584). Section 584(b) provides: "A common trust fund shall not be subject to taxation under this
chapter and for purposes of this chapter shall not be considered a corporation." Section
584(c) requires participants in a common trust fund to include in computing taxable income
their proportionate share of the gains, losses, and income of the fund.
61.

INT. REV. CODE

OF

1954, §584(a)(2).

62. 2 Fed. Reg. 2976 (1937); see note 13 supra.
63. For an account of Saxon's controversial tenure and a history of the office of Comptroller, see R.

ROBERTSON, THE COMPTROLLER AND BANK SUPERVISION

(1968).

64. Act of Sept. 28, 1962, 76 Stat. 668, 12 U.S.C. §92a (1970).
65. 12 C.F.R. §9 (1974).
66. See note 52 supra for an explanation of managing agency accounts.
67. 38 Fed. Reg. 3309, 3311 (1963).
68. A no-load fund is one that charges no sales commission on transactions.
69. Statement of James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency, Common Trust Funds
Hearings,supra note 5, at 34.
70. Subject to several exceptions, §5 of the Securities Act of 1933 requires issuers of
securities to register them with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. §77e (1970).
71. Section 7 of the Investment Company Act requires all investment companies, unless
exempted, to register with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. §80a-7 (1970).
72. For a discussion of what constitutes a security, see text accompanying note 137 infra.
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Company Act provision exempting "any common trust fund or similar fund
..maintained by a bank.., in its capacity as trustee, executor, administrator
or guardian."73 Furthermore the SEC maintained that, under its "ectoplasmic"
or "two-entity" theory, the fund itself, not the bank, was the issuer of the securities. 74 The importance of the ectoplasmic theory lay in determining
whether the CIF was entitled to cloak itself in the bank's exemption from registration under the Securities Acta and its exclusion from the definition of in6
vestment company under the Investment Company Act7
The securities industry's attack focused on the vulnerability of the CIF
'under the Glass-Steagall Act. The issue was joined when, in 1966, First
National City Bank of New York (Citibank), acquiescing in the SEC's view
regarding the applicability of the securities law, registered its CIF under the
Securities and Investment Company Acts.77 The Investment Company Institute (ICI) immediately brought suit, requesting that Regulation 9 be dedared invalid insofar as it authorized national banks to operate CIFs. 75 After
five years of litigation, the Supreme Court, in Investment Company Institute
v. Camp,7 9 ruled that Citibank's CIF involved that institution in the underwriting, issuing, selling, and distributing of securities in violation of section 16
of the Glass-Steagall Act while being simultaneously engaged in the business
73. 15 U.S.C. §80a-3(c)(3) (1970) (emphasis added).
74. Under the "ectoplasmic theory," a bank, insurance company, or other exempt entity
that offers a pooled investment fund may be deemed to have created a legally separate entity
subject to the provisions of the securities laws. The theory is based on the functional distinctions between the securities activities of the fund and the banking, insurance, or other activities of the exempt entity. The theory emphasizes that purchasers of the fund's securities
are purchasing interests only in the fund itself and not in the sponsoring entity. See Prudential Ins. Co., 41 S.E.C. 335 (1963), aff'd, 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
953 (1964).
75. Section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 exempts from registration "any security
issued or guaranteed by a bank." In 1970 Congress amended this section to specifically exempt
"any interest or participation in any common trust fund or similar fund maintained by a
bank exclusively for the collective investment or reinvestment of assets contributed thereto
by such bank in its capacity as trustee, -executor; administrator or guardian." Participations
in collective funds, however, are not "securities issued or guaranteed by a bank." 15 U.S.C.

§77(c)(a)(2) (1970).
76. Section 3(c)(3) exempts banks and common trust funds maintained by a bank "in its
capacity as trustee, executor, administrator, or guardian" from the definition of "investment
company." 15 U.S.C. §80a-3(c)(3) (1970).
77. The SEC, exercising its authority under §6 of the Investment Company Act, waived
the prohibition in the Act against an investment company having "a majority of its board
of directors consisting of . . . directors, officers or employees of any one bank." 15 U.S.C.
§80a-10(c) (1970). The purpose of this section, like that of §32 of the Glass-Steagall Act, is
to prevent abuse arising from interlocking directorates between banks and companies engaged in securities dealing. Comment, Baflks, Trusts and Investment Companies: The Com-

mingled Investment Fund, 115 U. PA. L. Rav. 1276, 1294-95 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Investment Fund].
78. The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) also brought suit to challenge
the SEC's authority to grant exemptions from §10 of the Investment Company Act. This suit
was consolidated with the ICI action at the appellate level. NASD v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83, 84
(D.C. Cir. 1969), vacated, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
79. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
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of accepting deposits, a violation of section 21 of the Act.8° The Court did not,
however, accept the ectoplasmic argument advanced by ICI. Rather, the Court,
in approving the Board's previous opinion 8 ' that a CIF does not violate the
affiliation and interlocking directorate proscriptions of the Act, stated:
The Bank has effective control over the activities of the investment
fund. Moreover, there is no danger that to characterize the bank and its
fund as a single entity will disserve the purpose of Congress. The
limitations which the banking laws place on the activities of national
banks are at least as great as the limitations placed on the activities of
their affiliates812

In support of its decision that the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited a bank-sponsored mutual fund, the Court relied on the legislative history of the Act and
reviewed the actual and potential abuses the Act was designed to remedy. The
Court concluded that, although:
From the perspective of competition, convenience and expertise, there
are arguments to be made in support of allowing commercial banks to
enter the investment banking business.... Congress determined that the
hazards . . . made it necessary to prohibit this activity to commercial

banks. Those same hazards are clearly present when a bank undertakes
to operate a mutual fund.8 3
In addition to reciting the litany of abuses that brought about passage of
Glass-Steagall Act, the Court admonished that promotional pressures
gendered by the existence of a "salesman's stake in the performance of
fund" might prove to be inconsistent with the "conservative traditions
commercial banking."

84

the
enthe
of

BANK-SPoNSORED INVESTMENT SERVICES TODAY

Although the Camp decision was a sharp blow to banking interests hoping
to secure their beachhead in the securities business, it has not forced banks into
abandoning attempts to provide investment services to their customers. Indeed,
today there are a greater number of such services in operation than ever before,
despite a serious downturn in the economy and resultant disillusionment with
equity investments. It is probable that an improvement in economic conditions
will provide the impetus for an even greater proliferation of bank-sponsored
investment devices. Two other factors are also likely to encourage the growth
of such services: increased computerization in the banking industry and the
demand by small investors for competent professional advice in a market increasingly dominated by institutional traders.

80. See text accompanying notes 51, 54 supra.
81. 30 Fed. Reg. 12,836 (1965), 12 C.F.R. §218.111 (1974).
82.

ICI v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 625 n.12 (1971).

83. Id. at 636.
84. Id. at 637.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 5
1975]

BANK-SPONSORED

INVESTMENT SERVICES

The imaginative utilization of the computer has revolutionized banking
services in the past two decades, greatly reducing the paperwork and analytical
time required in the management of trust department investments.8 However,
the high fixed costs of electronic data processing force banks to seek ways to
utilize their computing facilities to the limits of capacity. One way to maximize
computer utilization is to extend more administrative, bookkeeping, custodial,
and management services to the banks' smaller customers. These customers
have been increasingly discouraged from entering the market in recent years
by brokerage firms preoccupied with trust accounts, pension funds, and other
institutional investors.8 8 This disparity in access to the market between large
and small investors is further intensified by the imposition of an odd-lot differential on small transactions.17 Often, large institutions can minimize commission fees by dealing with "third market" broker-dealers or eliminate them
altogether by trading in the "fourth market."88 Yet another advantage of the
large investor is its ability to obtain the benefits of professional investment research services provided by the major brokerage firms. A common practice of
large "research houses" is to make their data available to institutions several
days before furnishing them to their account executives for dissemination to
individual customers.8 9
The new services presently being offered by banks can be grouped under
two headings: those that offer investment advice or portfolio management and
those that are primarily custodial and bookkeeping services. All but one of the
new services are based on the pooling of customers' funds and all but one are
nondiscretionary, that is, the customer, not the bank, has the responsibility for
making investment decisions.
Advising Investment Companies
Both banks and nonbank affiliates of bank holding companies have recently
begun serving as advisers to independent investment companies, primarily
companies specializing in income securities. The nonbank affiliates of bank
holding companies are required to register under the provisions of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,90 but banks themselves are specifically exempt
85.

See Chase, The Emerging Financial Conglomerate: Liberalization of the Bank

Holding Company Act, 60 GEo. L.J. 1225, 1234 (1972); New York Clearing House Association,
Response to SEC Securities Act Release 5491, at 6, 67 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Clearing
House Response].

86. See Bus. WEEK, June 2, 1973, at 58; Bus. WanK, April 17, 1971, at 86.
87. An odd-lot differential is the variable surcharge placed on orders of fewer than 100
shares (a round lot) of listed stocks.

88. The "first market" refers to the organized exchanges. The "second market!' is the
"over the counter" market in unlisted issues. Brokers in the "third market" specialize in
arranging transactions of listed stocks directly between large buyers and sellers. The "fourth

market" consists of the large institutional investors that maintain a computerized trading
interchange, thus avoiding brokerage commissions.
89. See Lybecker, Regulation of Bank Trust Department Investment Activities: Seven

Gaps: Eight Remedies, 2 Sm. REG. L.J. 122, 154 n.87 (1974).
90. 15 U.S.C. §80b-3 (1970). The Investment Company Act defines "investment adviser" as,
inter alia, "any person . . .who pursuant to a contract with [an investment] company reg-
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from registration. 9 Two factors appear to have provided the primary impetus
for the entry of banking organizations into the investment advising business.
The first was the Camp92 decision, which debarred national and Federal Reserve banks from marketing their own mutual funds. The second was the
Board of Governors' 1972 amendment to section 225.4 of Regulation y,93 the
Board's administrative rules for bank holding companies. That amendment,
which authorized holding company subsidiaries to serve as advisers to investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940,
quickly became the focal point of the advisory services controversy.
Under the provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, the
94
Board is charged with supervisory authority over all bank holding companies.
The 1970 amendments to the Act vested in the Board broad discretion in determining the types of businesses that lawfully could be controlled by bank
holding companies. 99 In addition to banks, holding companies may own or
control any company that "the Board after due notice and opportunity for
hearing has determined.. . to be so closely related to banking or managing or
controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto." 96 In determining whether
a proposed activity is a "proper incident" to banking, the Board is required to
weigh the likely public benefits of the activity - such as greater convenience,
increased competition, or greater efficiency - against possible adverse effects such as undue concentration, impairment of competition, conflicts of interest,
or unsound banking practices.9 7 Before it ruled that serving as an investment
adviser to an investment company was a proper incident to banking, the Board
considered possible Glass-Steagall impediments, which it addressed in an interpretive release 98 accompanying its ruling.
In its release the Board acknowledged the applicability of the Glass-Steagall
proscriptions to all bank holding companies and their banking and nonbanking subsidiaries, whether or not the holding company controlled any member
banks of the Federal Reserve System. 99 According to the Board, however, the
advising of mutual funds was not the sort of investment activity that the Act
sought to prohibit. Rather, it viewed such services as merely a variation of the
long-accepted banking practice of rendering investment advice to, and executing discretionary orders for, bank customers. 0 0 The Board and the banking
ularly furnishes advice to such company wth respect to the desirability of investing in, purchasing or selling securities or oiher property or is empowered to determine what securities
of other property shall be purchased or sold by such company." Id. §80a-2(a)(20).
91. Id. §806-2(11) (banks excluded from definition of "Investment Adviser").
92. ICI v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
93. 12 C.F.R. §225.4(a)(5)(ii) (1974).
94. 12 U.S.C. §§1841 et seq. (1970).
95. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, §103, 12 U.S.C. §1843 (1970).

96. Id. §1843(c)(8).
97. Id.
98. 12 C.F.R. §225.125 (1974).
99. Id.
100. See note 52 supra. Although the Board forbade bank holding company affiliates
from sponsoring, organizing, or controlling mutual funds, it applied no such restriction to
their relationships with closed-end investment companies. Since, unlike mutual funds, such
companies are ordinarily not engaged in issuing and redeeming their securities, the Board
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industry insisted that the provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act were aimed at
preventing banks from participating in the issuance and distribution of securities and that there was no evidence that bank holding companies or their
subsidiaries had engaged in such sales activity.' 0 ' The Investment Company
Institute, however, took the position that banks, bank holding companies, and
their associated investment companies should be viewed as a "single entity"
for Glass-Steagall purposes, citing the usual intimate relationship that exists
between a fund and its adviserl0 2 Failing in its attempt to have the Board
reconsider its ruling, ICI filed suit in May 1974, requesting that the court declare unlawful the advisement of mutual funds by bank holding company
affiliates. 03 That suit is still pending at the time of this writing.
The applicability vel non of the Glass-Steagall proscriptions to bank-related
investment advisers of open-end funds would appear to turn on whether a
particular adviser is so intimately connected with its associated investment
company as to be functionally one entity. The Glass-Steagall Act, as interpreted in Camp, forbids such a relationship since the adviser-banking organization would be, in effect, the issuer of the fund's securities.104 Arguably,
control of an investment company by a bank or bank holding company could
constitute that company an alter ego of the controlling entity for Glass-Steagall
purposes. The Bank Holding Company Act includes within the meaning of
"subsidiary" any company controlled by the holding company.-0 o The Act
embodies an exceedingly broad definition of control, encompassing not only
ownership and voting power, but also the exercise of a "controlling influence
over the management or policies of the bank or company."' 10 The determination of whether such influence exists in a particular instance is made by the
Board after notice and opportunity for hearing3o7 Although the Board has
included general management agreements in its list of rebuttable presumptions
of control, it has specifically excluded investment advisory contracts. 08 Furtherwas of the opinion that banks could sponsor them without contravening the provisions of
the Glass-Steagall Act. 12 C.F.R. §225.125() (1974). The distinction between open- and
dosed-end funds is discussed in note-28 supra.
101. Letter from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to counsel for
ICI, March 8, 1974, reprinted in CCH FED. BANKING L. RE'. 1196,202, 81,261 (1974); Citizens
and Southern Investment Counseling, Inc., Comments on Banks Acting as Investment Advisers

to Investment Companies 11 (filed with the SEC in response to Securities Act Release No.
5491) (Aug. 9, 1974).
102. ICI petition to Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Dec. 12, 1973.
103. Letter from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to counsel for
ICI, March 8, 1974, reprinted in CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. §196,202, at 81,261 (1974).
104. ICI v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 639 (1971). If the adviser in such circumstances is a

bank, §§16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act would be violated. If the adviser is a nonbank
subsidiary of a bank holding company, only §21 would be violated. For an argument that

the advising of a mutual fund by a nonbank subsidiary does not contravene §21, see Letter
from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to counsel for ICI, March 8,
1974, reprinted in CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. §196,202, at 81,260-61 (1974).
105. 12 U.S.C. §1841(d) (1970).

106. Id. §§1841(a)(2)(C), (d).
107. Id.
108. 12 C.FR. §225.2(b)(3) (1974).,
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more, the Board, in a review of exhibits submitted by ICI in its petition for
reconsideration of the Regulation Y amendment, found no evidence that ad0
These factual
visers were involved in the distribution of any fund securities. 1°
0
findings, combined with the traditional judicial deference" to rules promulgated by administrative agencies under a specific statutory grant of rulemaking
power,"' place ICI at a serious disadvantage in its struggle to have bank advisement of investment companies declared illegal.
Assuming no single entity is shown, does an investment company-adviser
relationship fall within the managing agency exception to section 16 of the
Glass-Steagall Act? The facile response of the banking interests that a mutual
fund is merely a "customer" like all other managing agency clients'-' is somewhat disingenuous in that it fails to point out that ordinary clients, unlike
mutual funds, are not in the business of buying, selling, and underwriting
securities. Given the sordid history of bank relationships with investment trusts
and the potential for abuse, it would seem that the adviser-mutual fund relationship merits close scrutiny to determine to what extent it conflicts with or
subserves public policy. Few of the abuses that motivated the drafters of the
Glass-Steagall Act, however, are likely to arise from the adviser-investment company relationship among entities subject to Regulation Y. The danger of unsound loans from the bank to the company is obviated by the Board's prohibition of any extension of credit to the company."5 Nor may a holding company
or one of its subsidiaries as principal, trustee, or agent, purchase shares of the
advised company. This provision discourages any temptation to push shares
onto trust department accounts." 4 A holding company and its subsidiaries may
not accept the investment company's shares as collateral for loans to purchase
such shares." 5 Other provisions established by the Board prohibit: the name
of the investment company from being the same as, or similar to, that of the
holding company or its subsidiaries;" 6 the solicitation on behalf of, or the giving of opinions respecting, the investment company by holding company
personnel;"' and the furnishing of names of bank customers to the investment
company."" For nonbank subsidiaries of a bank holding company, the restrictions imposed by the Board are augmented by the requirements of the Investment Advisers Act." 9 Where the adviser is a bank, it is subject to general
20
fiduciary obligations imposed upon banks in their role as managing agent.
109. Letter from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to counsel for

IC, March 8, 1974, reprinted in CCH Fr,. BANKING L. REP. 196,202, at 81,261 (1974).
110.

See I K. DAVIs,

ADMINISrI1ATVE LAw TREATISE §5

(1958).

111. Rulemaking authority is conferred on the Board by 12 U.S.C. §1844(b) (1970).
112. See, e.g., Association of Registered Bank Holding Companies, Reply to Comments
of Justice Department and ICI on Proposed Amendment to Regulation Y at 3 (1971).

113. 12 C.F.R. §225.125(g)(3) (1974).
114. Id. §§225.125(g)(1), (2).
115. Id. §§225.125(g)(1), (4).
116. Id. §225.125(f).
117. Id. §225.125(h).
118. Id. §225.125.
119. 15 U.S.C. §§80b-3 through 80b-8 (1970).
120. "Unless otherwise agreed, an agent employed to make or to manage investments
has a duty to the principal: (a) to use care to invest promptly; (b) to invest only in such
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Furthermore, the activities of banks and nonbank affiliates qua investment advisers are subject to the scrutiny of federal bank examiners: the Comptroller,
the Board of Governors, and the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.121 All state chartered banks are, of course, also subject
to examination by state banking authorities. The Comptroller's Regulation 9
22
is expressly made applicable to managing agency, as well as trust, accounts.
Regulation 9 forbids, inter alia, unreasonable "float" (the profit made by a
bank from the interest-free use of deposited funds) by requiring that funds
not be held uninvested or undistributed any longer than is reasonably necessary. 23 The Regulation also prohibits certain types of self-dealing by a
fiduciary, thus minimizing the likelihood of the bank as adviser purchasing its
own issues or supporting the price of its stock. 124 Regulation 9 prohibits another common investment trust abuse by limiting compensation of fiduciaries
to "reasonable" sums.1- In addition, banks, bank holding companies, and their
affiliates are subject to liability under the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws.'

2 6

Although technically, Regulation Y governs only the nonbank subsidiaries

of bank holding companies, the Board has indicated that it intends to impose
the same standards on all state member banks of the Federal Reserve System.

A serious disparity in regulation could develop, however, if the Comptroller
declines to follow the Board's standards in his capacity as overseer of national
banks. For example, Regulation 9 permits the sale of assets from one fiduciary
account to another. 27 Regulation Y, on the other hand, forbids the sale of the
investment company's shares to the bank. 2 8 Not only does the inapplicability
of the Board's rules to national banks create unnecessary complexity in regulation, it also provides loopholes for national banks tempted to circumvent the
strictures of Regulation Y. Additional confusion is injected into the regulatory
scheme by the existence of another set of banks not subject to the limitations
securities as would be obtained by a prudent investor for his own account, having in view
both safety and income, in the light of the principal's means and purposes; and (c) to
change investments on the conditions of the principal, if his duties include management."
REsTATE ENT (SECOND) oF AGENCY §425 (1957). Statutes or administrative rules may alter

the duties of the managing agent. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 122-126 infra.
121. See note 5 supra.
122. 12 CX..R. §9.1(b) (1974).

123. Id. §9.10(a).
124. Id. §9.12(c). A potentially dangerous exception to this prohibition exists in the
clause that allows the parties to agree in the instrument that the agent bank may buy or
sell its own stock.
125. Id. §9.15(a). As in §9.12(c), this section excepts agreements contained in the instrument.
126. See Securities Act of 1933, §17(a), 15 U.S.C. §77q(a) (1970); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, §10, 15 U.S.C. §78j (1970); SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1974). "A national

bank acting as investment agent.., is not immune or exempt from the antifraud provisions
Bakery Drivers Pension Fund Trust, Local 734 v. Conof the federal securities laws ....
tinental Illinois Nat'1 Bank &Trust Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff94,565, at 95,955 (N.D. Ill.
1974). See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
127. 12 C.F.R. §9.12(d) (1974). The transaction must be "fair to both accounts." Id.
128. 12 C.F.R. §225.125(g)(2) (1974).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss3/5

16

Welch: Bank-Sponsored Investment Services: Statutory Proscriptions, Juri
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

of Regulation Y: the numerous independent state banks answerable only to
the FDIC and state banking authorities. Given the potential for abuse that
inheres in an investment company-adviser relationship, the present hodgepodge
of regulations is unnecessarily dangerous to both depositors and investors.
The Automatic Investment Service
The automatic investment service (AIS) is a nondiscretionary device that
allows a bank depositor to make systematic investments in corporations selected from a list of 25 to 35 of the largest companies in the United States. An
allotted amount, ranging from 20 dollars to 500 dollars, is withdrawn each
month from the customer's account and combined with funds of others purchasing the same stock. Promptly after a cutoff date (which may be no longer
than 30 days from the date of withdrawal from the depositor's account), the
pooled monies are used to purchase the designated shares. For this service the
customer pays the bank a fee of up to two dollars, plus a pro rata share of the
brokerage commission.129 Advantages of the AIS are convenience, regularity of
investment, and lower cost through avoidance of the odd-lot differential.
Certificates are normally held in the bank's name or that of its nominee. Although the first AIS was organized in 1973, following an opinion from the
Comptroller that its operation would not violate the Glass-Steagall Act,130
continued uncertainty as to its legality and unfavorable economic conditions
have limited the total number of such plans in operation to approximately 22
as of mid-1974.11
Once again, the Investment Company Institute, now joined by the New
York Stock Exchange, has emerged to do battle with a competitor. In September 1974 suit was filed in federal district court alleging that the Comptroller
had exceeded his authority in approving a service allegedly violative of sections 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act. 32 The plaintiffs maintain, inter alia,
that the banks are creating security interests by pooling the funds of individual
customers and by holding shares in the name of the bank or its nominee.133
The banking industry and Comptroller, however, take the position that AIS is
merely a variety of managing agency service, made possible by the advent of
electronic data processing. [14 They emphasize that the stock is selected by the
customer, not the bank, and that there is no separate fund or entity issuing
35
shares.

129. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5491 (April 30, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 18,163 (1974).
130. Letter from James E. Smith, Comptroller of the Currency, to G. Duane Vieth, June
10, 1974, reprinted in CCH FED BANKING L. REP. 1196,272, at 81,354 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Smith Letter].
131. AM. BANKER, July 26, 1974, at 1.
132. New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Smith, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1194,798 (D.D.C., complaint filed Sept. 24, 1974).
133. Id. at 96,656.
134. Smith Letter, supra note 130, at 81,306; Security Pacific National Bank, Response to
SEC Inquiry Into Bank-Sponsored Investment Services 23-45 (Aug. 12, 1974).
135. Smith Letter, supra note 130, at 81,359.
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Since the Glass-Steagall Act does not define the term "security," the courts
have looked to the definition set forth in the Securities Act of 1933. That act
defines "security" as one of an enumerated list of interests, of no concern in
the present discussion, and as an "investment contract."' 30 The commonly
used definition of "investment contract" was set forth by the Supreme Court in
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.:
A contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in
a common enterprise and is led 3to
expect profits solely from the efforts
7
of the promoter or a third party.
Clearly, an AIS is a common enterprise in the limited sense that any profits or
losses would accrue to all investors in a particular stock. There is, however, no
expectation of profits from the managerial efforts of the bank, since the
customer, not the AIS, determines the amount and nature of the investment to
be made. In contradistinction to the CIF struck down in Camp, the AIS does
not involve a situation where "an investor relinquishes control over his funds
and submits their control to another ...
1,8 Rather, the bank is bound to
execute the customer's order, the timing of the purchase being the only discretion allowed it. Moreover, the staff of the SEC has considered the question and
has issued a "no action" letter stating that, if certain requirements are met, AIS
would be considered a "user's account" and not an issuer of a security within
the meaning of the Securities and Investment Company Acts. 3 9 The New York
Stock Exchange itself has, for many years, sponsored its own monthly investment plan. That plan, and similar plans sponsored by investment brokerage
houses, have never been considered to be issuers of securities.
The securities industry cites a host of abuses that it believes might occur if
banks are allowed to offer AIS. One of the more serious of these is that the
interests of the bank's trust department, which administers AIS, are, or might
be, antithetical to the interests of the commercial side. For example, the commercial loan department might be pressured into distorting "a bank's credit
decisions regarding loans to AIS participants to facilitate purchases of stock
through AIS and possibly loans to companies whose stocks could be bought
through AIS." 4 There would seem to be little support for these charges, however, since the bank's stake in its customers' AIS investments is limited to a
modest service fee -hardly the incentive to accept poor credit risks. Furthermore, such loans are detectable by bank examiners, whose functions include
analyzing patterns of loans to detect conflicts of interest.1
'4
A more substantial charge directed at AIS is that the sponsoring bank will
abuse its discretion in timing purchases in order to maximze the interest-free
136. 15 U.S.C. §77b(1) (1970).
137. 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
138. ICI v. Camp, 274 F. Supp. 624, 642 (D.D.C. 1967).
139. See Investment Data Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SE. L. REP. 279,411,
at 83,184 (1973).
140. New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Smith, CCH FFa. Sec, L, RE', 94,798, at 96,656
(D.D.C., complaint filed Sept. 24, 1974).
141. Smith Letter, supra note 130, at 81,361,
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use of the customer's funds.142 However, abuse of "float" is unlikely because,
under the terms of the Comptroller's opinion143 and the SEC's "no action"
letter,14 4 the bank must purchase stock within thirty days after withdrawal of
the funds from the customers' checking accounts. Moreover, uninvested trust
department cash has traditionally been the object of particular attention by
bank examiners."- According to one commentator, "trust department internal
auditors, to spike potential trust examiner criticism, are said to be criticized
by their own bank supervisors for being . . . more hardnosed than trust ex-

aminers in reviewing uninvested trust department cash.'

14 6

The Mini-Account
"Mini-account" is a rubric for two types of managing agency services made
possible through the computerization of investment management functions.
Under one such plan, entitled Special Investment Advisory Service (SIAS) by
its originator, Citibank, the bank possesses discretion in managing a client's
investment portfolio. In the second type of mini-account the bank merely
mails a list of recommendations to the client, who is free to follow or disregard
them. 47 The distinguishing feature of both types is that they offer professional,
semi-individualized investment management for accounts as small as $10,000$25,000. In contrast, many banks require a minimum of $200,000 for traditional managing agency accounts. As the result of a consent decree accepted by
Citibank in settlement of a 1970 suit brought by the SEC, the SIAS variety of
automatic investment service is no longer offered. 4 The SEC had insisted that
the SIAS was, in effect, an unregistered investment company issuing unregistered securities.1 4 It based its allegations on the fact that Citibank had
discretionary power over the customer's funds and that its investment decisions,
while ostensibly individualized, showed a marked degree of parallelism.1n To
142. New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Smith, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ]]94,798, at 96,656
(D.D.C., complaint filed Sept. 24, 1974).
143. Smith Letter, supra note 130, at 81,362.
144. Investment Data Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 179,411, at
83,184 (1973).
145. Smith Letter, supra note 130, at 81,362.
146. Lybecker, supra note 89. at 142.
147. For an annual fee of $100, the Harris Bank of Chicago supplies its mini-account
subscribers with the following information on each of 12 selected common stocks: (a) a
monthly commentary, (b) a one-, six-, and twelve-month price performance history, (c) the
most recent closing price, (d) the high and low prices for the year, (e) the annual dividend
rate, (f) the current dividend yield, (g) an estimate of the company's earning per share for
the current year, and (h) the current price-to-earnings ratio. Letter from James E. Mandler,
Sr., Vice President, Harris Bank g-Trust Co., to George Fitzsimmons, Secretary, SEC, Aug. 9,
1974, in response to SEC Securities Act Release No. 5491.
148. SEC v. First Nat'l City Bank [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RE'.
92,592 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In harmony with its theory that the investment service was a separate
juridical entity, the SEC joined as defendants not only the bank and its broker but also the
SIAS itself. Id.; see note 74 supra.
149. SEC Litigation Release No. 4534 (Feb. 6, 1970).
150. Id.
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the SEC these factors strongly suggested the existence of a security within the
meaning of the Securities Act. What emerged from the 1970 stipulation was
the advice-by-mail type of mini-account presently offered by a number of banks.
The legality of this plan under the Glass-Steagall Act would not appear to be
in serious doubt. The SEC's Advisory Committee on Investment Management
Services recently stated that, since under such a plan "the investor in each
instance is free to accept or reject a specific recommendation, it would be
difficult to find a security under present interpretations of the Securities Act."1 51
Although there appears to be no Glass-Steagall impediment to the operation
of nondiscretionary mini-accounts, it has been suggested that a bank as creditor
might be tempted to recommend to its advisees the shares of a faltering debtor
corporation in order to forestall possible default. It seems unlikely, however,
that any benefit accruing to the bank through support of the debtor's stock in
the open market or even through the purchase of its shares during a new issue
would be commensurate with the risk involved in such a scheme. The appearance of an unsound corporation on the records of both the commercial
lending and the investment management divisions of the bank could hardly
escape the notice of examiners. Clearly, too, the use of the mails to make misleading investment recommendations would subject the bank to civil suits and
criminal penalties under the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange

Act of 1934.152
The Dividend Reinvestment Plan
A dividend reinvestment plan (DRP) typically involves the bank as agent
for the shareholder of a participating company, which pays the shareholder's
dividends directly to the bank. The bank then "bunches" the individual
dividends and purchases more of the participating corporation's shares, retaining in its custody the whole and fractional shares purchased. Many of the
plans also allow the shareholders to contribute additional sums for purchase

of the company's stock. The Glass-Steagall and conflict-of-interest considerations previously discussed in regard to AIS are equally applicable to dividend
reinvestment plans.153 The SEC staff has adopted a "no action" position on

151. SEC, SMALL AccouNT INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT SERVICES 24-25 (1973). Although the
report did not specifically deal with bank-sponsored mini-accounts, the Committee made one
statement that, if accepted by the courts, would cast doubt on the continuing validity of the
discretionary managing agency account. The Committee suggested that each such discretionary
account might be considered an investment contract, albeit not one involving a public offering. This analysis, however, hardly comports with the Howey requirement of "common
enterprise." See text accompanying note 137 supra. A similar argument was rejected by the
circuit court in Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.

887 (1972). There the court held that an individual, discretionary commodities trading account was not a security but an agency. An opposite conclusion, however, was reached by
the Fifth Circuit in SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
152. 15 U.S.C. §§78j, 78ff (1970); SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1974). See
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
153. See text accompanying notes 132-146 supra.
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DRPs that conform to certain standards designed "to insure that the operation
of the plan does not result in the creation of a separate security.
THE "CHINESE WALL" ISSUE

All bank-sponsored investment services that place the bank in the role of
adviser or discretionary account manager involve the danger of what is probably the greatest potential abuse in today's complex and interdependent commercial environment. That is the possibility of the wrongful use by a trust
department of material inside information obtained from the bank's commercial side. In recent years the traditional fiduciary duty to utilize all available sources of information in investment management 55 has collided with a
growing body of case law holding insiders and their "tippees" liable for taking
advantage of their favored circumstances. 56 Although the possibility of misuse of inside information is often cited in arguments against allowing banks
to enter new areas of the investment business, there is no indication that investment services are more subject to abuse than are banks' traditional trust
and pension fund management activities. In fact, it has been not commercial
banking, but rather the securities industry, that has been most involved in
litigation over insider abuses. In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc.,157 the court found Merrill Lynch in violation of section 10(b)158
and rule 1Ob-5159 of the Securities Exchange Act for disclosing to its brokerage
customers material inside information to which it had become privy in its role
as lead underwriter for Douglas Aircraft Company. The court held that a
person in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to

154. See Lucky Stores, Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. f79,903 (1974). The following restrictions were imposed by the Division of Investment Management as conditions to a "noaction" position regarding Investment Company Act registration: (I) dividends must be invested promptly, (2) charges must be limited to reasonable transaction fees, (3) economies
of scale must be passed on pro rata to participants, (4) proxy materials must be passed on
to participants, (5) participants must be able to receive certificates for their whole shares if
they so desire, and (6) provision must be made for passing on rights or warrants to the
participants. In addition, if the plan allows cash contributions, it must: (1) urge participants

to transmit cash as close as possible to the dividend payment date, (2) provide for investment
of late contributions as soon as funds sufficient to purchase a round lot are accumulated,
and (3) allow for return of cash if the participant so requests up until a reasonable time
before the cash is invested. Id. at 84,315.
155. Traditionally, bank trust department personnel were expected to meet regularly
with lending officers in order to keep abreast of relevant inside information upon which to
base investment decisions. Failure to utilize the resources of the commercial side in managing
trust investments might even have subjected the bank to liability for breach of trust. Herman
& Safanda, The Commercial Bank Trust Department and the "Wall," 14 B.C. IND. & CoM. L.
REv. 21, 22-26 (1973).
156. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d
Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1968); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
157. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
158. 15 U.S.C. §78j (1970).
159. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1974).
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the public or refrain from using the information. 160 This "disclose or abstain"
rule is equally applicable to banks, which often receive privileged information
in their role as creditor.
One reaction of large banks to cases such as Shapiro has been the abandonment of the traditional habit of sharing inside information with the trust department. Indeed, many large banks have constructed "Chinese walls" between their commercial and trust departments in order to prevent the passage
of material inside information. The existence of a "wall," of course, presents
a number of new problems, such as determining what information is both
"material" and "inside" and explaining to trust customers why their portfolios
were being loaded with XYZ stock when the XYZ Company was simultaneously
defaulting on a loan from the bank's commercial side; Serious impairment of
efficiency can result where the trust officer is precluded by a too-strict policy
from tapping valuable nonprivileged information in the files of the lending
officers. On the other hand, liability under the securities laws awaits the bank
that is remiss in building and maintaining its "wall." 161
Even more disturbing to banks and investment houses than insuring impermeability of the "wall" is the spectre raised by the case of Slade v. Shear-

son, Hammill & Co.162 In that case a federal district court rejected the "wall"
as a defense to a lOb-5 suit by brokerage customers of Shearson, Hammill who
claimed they had been advised to purchase certain shares of a corporation even
though the underwriting side of the brokerage firm had come into possession of
materially adverse information concerning that corporation. The court in
Slade admonished members of the investment banking-brokerage industry (and
by implication the commercial banking industry) that, if they continued to
place themselves in what the court viewed as a conflict-of-interest situation by
performing both advisory and underwriting functions, they would have to accept the consequences. 163 The circuit court of appeals recently declined to decide the Slade issue until the factual and legal questions involved have been
further defined by the district court. 6 4

160. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir.
1974). The rule that insiders either must publicly disclose material inside information or
refrain from taking advantage of it was first enunciated in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 894 U.S. 976 (1968).
161. The Comptroller in an effort to discourage the illegal use of material inside information, amended Regulation 9 to allow departments of a national bank to utilize the
facilities and personnel of other departments only to the extent not prohibited by law. 12
C.F.R. §9.7(d) (1974). In addition, Regulation 9 requires that legal counsel be readily
available to advise the bank and its trust department. 12 C.F.R. §9.7(c) (1974).
162. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. §94,329 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (mem. opinion denying motion by
defendant for summary judgment).
163. Id. at 95,182.
164. Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 288 BNA SEc. REG. L. REP. A-1 (1974). The court
refused to decide the certified question whether "a brokerage firm that received adverse inside
information about a company as a result of a confidential investment banking relationship
violates Rule lOb-5 when its brokerage division continues to solicit customers for the company's securities." Id. The court considered the issues so complex that "an abstract answer
is the least desirable of judicial solutions." Id.
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The obvious import of Slade, should it be upheld by the appellate court, is
that, at least in the second circuit, banks may find themselves in the impossible
position of being liable for advising customers on the basis of material inside
information and equally liable if they make recommendations at variance with
such information. Many of the large commercial banks most active in the
sponsorship of advisory services are also those most involved in extensive lending relationships with widely traded corporations. These institutions may find
it impossible to conduct advisory activities without exposing themselves to
broad lOb-5 liability to disappointed customers. 165 Large banks may thus be
forced to divest themselves of such services, including the management of
trusts and pension accounts. The probable effect of such divestitures would be
an immediate increase in the cost of advisory services and possibly the liquida166
tion of smaller, less profitable accounts.
A

MODEL FOR "EQUAL REGULATION"

OF BANK-SPONSORED INVESTMENT SERVICES

In addition to objections based on alleged violations of the Glass-Steagall
Act, the securities industry also opposes bank-sponsored investment vehicles on
the grounds that, since banks are exempt from many of the provisions of the
federal securities laws, their investment customers lack the protection afforded
by those laws and the banks themselves enjoy an unfair competitive advantage. 167 In response to the outcry from the securities industry for "equal
regulation" of the competing banks, the SEC appears to be moving toward a
position as protector of the economic interests of the industry, in addition to
its traditional role as champion of the investing public.168 The tendency for
regulatory agencies to bring their regulated industries under their protective
aegis is, of course, a common one and may be unavoidable in a pluralistic
society where policy is formulated through the clash of special interests. The
Comptroller, for example, is commonly considered the "friend" of the national
banks in their confrontations with other special interest groups.',69 There is no
evidence that this role vis i vis outsiders impairs his ability to perform traditional supervisory functions over banks. What this sort of relationship does
mean, however, is that the Comptroller and the SEC are likely to view issues
of mutual concern through the parochial eyes of their respective client industries. This identification of the regulator with the regulated is exacerbated
by inter-agency power struggles in which each regulatory body seeks to defend
165. Small banks, of course, are less likely to be in the position of "insider" with respect
to companies in which their trust departments invest or that they recommend for investment.
166. Herman & Safanda, supra note 155, at 43.
167. Merrill Lynch, in its response to SEC Securities Act Release No. 5491 (requesting
comments on bank-sponsored investment services) listed 14 areas in which it alleged unequal
regulation exists between banks and the securities industry. Letter from Thomas B. Shearman, Vice President, Merrill Lynch, to George Fitzsimmons, Secretary of the SEC at 8-11,
Aug. 21, 1974. See also Letter from Norman S. Poser, Senior Vice President, American Stock

Exchange, to George Fitzsimmons, Secretary of the SEC at 5 (Nov. 1, 1974).
168. Explanations for this drift are couched in the language of "equal regulation." Evans,
supra note 6, at 612.
169. 73 YALE L.J. 1249, 1264 n.123 (1964).
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(and often to expand) its traditional scope of authority.170 Thus, the Comptroller, quite predictably, takes an "entity" approach to regulatory boundary
marking, which requires that, because the investment services are offered by
national banks and national banks are regulated by the Comptroller, the investment services should also be regulated by the Comptroller.' 71 The "special
needs" of banks, such as the maintenance of solidarity and prudential practices,
and the special expertise of the bank regulators in meeting those needs are
also used to justify the "entity" approach. The SEC, on the other hand, accustomed to four decades of dealing with the securities issues of companies in
a multitude of disparate industries, naturally takes a functional approach to
the regulation of bank-sponsored investment services. The Chairman of the
SEC recently stated that, in his opinion, the demarcation between the banking
and securities industries, upon which Congress presumably based its decisions
to exempt banks from some parts of the securities laws, has become blurred in
recent years. 172 The exemptions, he stated, are inappropriate where a bank
performs functions indistinguishable from those performed by brokers or
mutual funds. 73 The "ectoplasmic" concept has for many years been the SEC's
principal theoretical vehicle for circumventing the entity exemptions in the
securities laws. 174 In litigation the "ectoplasmic" theory has enjoyed some
success, although the courts have refrained from expressly articulating this
conceptually awkward doctrine, possibly for fear of creating precedent for its
application in unsuitable circumstances. 75 Equally important, the mere threat
of suit by the SEC to require registration of bank-sponsored investment services
has usually been enough to force banks to conform to the SEC's "no action"
conditions. 70 This threat of suit is an effective regulatory tool largely because

170. A modem classic in the literature of regulatory politics is Huntington, The
Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, The Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YArx L.J.
467 (1952). Professor Huntington describes the evolution of the ICC from its creation in the

face of railroad opposition, through its gradual detente with the industry, to its eventual
acceptance of the role of industry ombudsman.
171. Memorandum from James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency, to a subcomm. of
the House Committee on Government Operations, reprinted in Common Trust Fund Hearings, supra note 5, at 34. The entity approach, common among regulatory agencies, is

enthusiastically supported by the regulated industry. See Huntington, supra note 170, at 477.
172. Garrett, supra note 6, at 83,713.
173. Id.
174. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
175. The Supreme Court lent some support to the SEC approach in SEC v. Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co. (VALIC), 359 U.S. 65 (1959). Piercing the exemptions granted to life
insurance and annuity contracts under the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act,
the Court enjoined VALIC from offering variable annuity contracts without registering
under the two acts. Variable annuities, the Court found, are functionally dissimilar to
ordinary insurance and annuity plans in that the risk is borne by the annuitant, whose return is dependent largely on the exigencies of the stock market. The SEC's position regardiag bank-sponsored investment services is similar in its insistence that if a bank offers investment services functionally distinguishable from traditional banking services it may lose its
exemptions under the securities laws. See note 74 supra.
176. Banks have been careful to conform their AIS and DRP plans to the dictates of the
SEC staff's "no action" letters. See notes 139, 154 supra and accompanying text. Today's
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an adverse court decision would mean not merely the registration of the service
as sought by the Commission, but its complete prohibition. This is so because
the necessary prerequisite to a requirement for registration is the issuance of a
"security," an activity forbidden to banks and their affiliates under the GlassSteagall Act. The existence of the Glass-Steagall prohibitions thus affords the
SEC significant de facto regulatory power over the investment activities of
banks.
The position of the banking industry and their regulators is that the bank
exemptions were placed in the securities laws, not because the banks performed
or did not perform certain functions, but because they, unlike most other types
of businesses, were subject to extensive governmental oversight, including
regular visitorial examinations.1 77 The banking interests maintain that requiring banks to conform to laws and rules designed to protect investors in
ordinary, relatively unregulated corporations would be duplicative and
burdensome. Such requirements, they claim, would actually place banks at a
disadvantage relative to competitors not subject to expensive and time-consuming on-site examination." 8 Another reason often cited for exempting banks
from the securities laws is that the disclosure orientation of those laws is illsuited to an industry where public confidence is the sine qua non of continued
solvency. 179 Bank regulation, in contrast to that of the securities industry, is
largely characterized by confidentiality in examinations, reports, and corrective action.8 0 Usually, serious financial problems of a bank will not become
public knowledge until after the FDIC and other regulatory agencies have arranged for the bank's merger with a stronger institution.181 Despite the advent
of deposit insurance, presently limited to 40,000 dollars per customer, 82- there
still exists the real danger of runs by depositors who become aware of the
bank's financial difficulties. The liquidity of demand deposits makes them
exteremely volatile. It is only prudent for a large depositor to withdraw its
demand deposit balance at the first indication of trouble even where there may
be little real danger of bank failure. Adding to this danger is the increased
reliance by banks on purchased funds, which has made many of them overly

mini-accounts are likewise the product of conditions set by the SEC. See SEC Litigation Re-

lease No. 4534 (Feb. 6, 1970); Clearing House Response, supra note 85, at 17.
177.

See Citizens and Southern Investment Counseling, Inc., Comments an Banks Acting

as Investment Advisers to Investment Companies (filed with the SEC in response to Securities
Act Release No. 5491) (Aug. 9, 1974).
178. See Security Pacific National Bank, Response to SEC Inquiry Into Bank-Sponsored
Investment Services 13-14 (Aug. 12, 1974).
179. The importance of confidentiality in matters relating to the financial condition of
banks was recognized by Congress when it provided an exception to the Freedom of Information Act for "examination, operating or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for
the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions."

5 U.S.C. §522(b)(8) (1970).
180.

See Murane, SEC, FTC, and the Federal Bank Regulators: Emerging Problems of

Administrative JurisdictionalOverlap, 61 GEo. L.J. 37 (1972).
181. See, e.g., the recent case of Security National Bank, which was quickly and quietly
merged with Chemical Bank of New York. Wall Street J., Jan. 20, 1975, at 3.
182. Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500 (1974).
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dependent on the continued confidence of money market suppliers.' s3 In
blaming several recent bank failures on the sudden drying up of these funds, a
Director of the FDIC has stated: "[I]t would appear that the greatest danger
to a financial institution today lies not in a loss of confidence by the public at
large, but rather illiquidity resulting from the mistrust of money market
funds."'a8 4 Despite the proven sensitivity of depositors and money market
suppliers, it is still problematical, however, whether their confidence would be
affected by activities as remote and unrelated to bank solvency as the investment services currently being offered.
Both the bank regulators and the SEC have legitimate interests in the
supervision of bank-sponsored investment services. The challenge is to formulate a means for synthesizing these interests in a workable regulatory model.
Both the jurisdictional and the Glass-Steagall issues engendered by banking's
recent incursions into the securities business are likely to be considered and
possibly resolved by the 94th Congress. 8 5 Senator Harrison Williams, Chairman of the Securities Subcommittee of the Senate Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs Committee, announced in May 1974 that his subcommittee
would probably undertake a "thorough reexamination of the appropriateness
and effectiveness of the Glass-Steagall prohibitions" in light of today's regulatory environment.8 6 Clearly, some adjustment in the Glass-Steagall Act is
called for. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, commenting
on the desirability of bank-sponsored investment vehicles, noted that "the
encouragement of new and diverse forms of investment services for investors
will further efficiency and innovation and thereby result in lower costs and
'
greater choice in services.' 187
Clearly, too, adequate provision must be made for the protection of investors utilizing these services and for the competitive interests of both the
banks and the securities industry. In seeking solutions to the myriad problems
presented by bank-sponsored investment services, several factors should be
borne in mind:

183. Money market funds are brokered by various financial institutions, including large
New York banks and relatively small independent brokers. Access to sources of funds is
dependent on the continued confidence of the lenders. For further discussion of money
market activities, see M. MAYER, TIE BANKERS 201-31 (1974); Murane, supra note 180, at
52-58.
184. Address by George A. LeMaistre, Director, FDIC, before the Earnings Assets Conference of the Pennsylvania Bankers Association, reprinted in 277 BNA SEC. REG. L. REP.

A-21 (1974).
185.

Two previous attempts by the Senate to allow banks to sponsor CIFs were rebuffed

in the House. See HousE CoMm.

ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, INVESTMENT

COM-

Acr OF 1970, H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 10 (1970); S. 2704,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
186. Address by Sen. Harrison A. Williams before the Governing Council of the American
Bankers Association,.White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., April 25, 1974.
'187. United States Department of Justice, Comments in Response to SEC Inquiry Concerning Bank-Sponsored Investment Services at 3 (Aug. 23, 1974).
PANY AMENDM ENs
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(1) The need for adequate investor protection.
(2) The need for protection of legitimate banking requirements of confidentiality in examination and enforcement.
(3) The desirability of equalization, to the extent allowed by differing
regulatory requirements, of competitive position between banks and members of the securities industry. This does not mean, in the words of a member of the SEC, that regulatory requirements should be "cast in the same
Procrustean mold merely to serve symmetry." 188
(4) The desirability of uniform application of regulation among state
and nationally chartered banks.
(5) The desirability of minimizing duplicative regulation.
In a recent article concerning bank-sponsored investment services, Commissioner Evans of the SEC outlined a number of regulatory alternatives located
along a continuum from "doing nothing" to completely precluding the offering
of such services.1' 9 He suggested that the optimal solution to the jurisdictional
problem might be to leave rulemaking and enforcement functions in the hands
of the respective federal bank regulatory agencies but to give the SEC the
authority to review and, if necessary, alter the agencies' decisions regarding investment services. 90 A similar model for achieving the five desiderata listed
above is suggested by the municipal securities trading provisions of the recently
enacted Securities Acts Amendments of 1975.191 Section 13 of the Act provides
for self-regulation of municipal securities dealers through a rulemaking board
composed of representatives from the various categories of institutions involved
in municipal securities trading.192 The board is charged with the responsibility
for adopting rules relating to, inter alia, the qualifications of municipal securities dealers, the prevention of fraudulent and manipulative acts, the facilitation of municipal securities transactions, and, in general, the protection
of the investing public. 1 93 To avoid duplication and unnecessary expense, the

rulemaking board does not have examination and enforcement powers of its
own, but relies on the established regulatory authorities to perform those
functions in accordance with the board's rules. 194 Coordination of enforcement
activities is insured by requiring the regulatory authorities to consult with the
188. Letter from John R. Evans, Commissioner, SEC, to Sen. Harrison A. Williams, Jr.,
May 8, 1974, quoted in United States Department of Justice, Comments in Response to SEC
Inquiry Concerning Bank Sponsored Investment Services 7 (Aug. 23, 1974).
189. Evans, supra note 6.
190. Id. at 618-19.
191. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, §13, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 131, amending
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by adding new §15B after §15A, 15 U.S.C. §78o-3 (1970).
192. "[M]embership of the Board shall at all times be equally divided among public
representatives, broker-dealer representatives, and bank representatives, and . . . the public
representatives shall be subject to approval by the [Securities and Exchange] Commission to
assure that ... at least one is representative of investors in municipal securities and at least
one is representative of issuers of municipal securities." Securities Acts Amendments of 1975,
§13, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 133.
193. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, §13, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 132-34.
194. Responsibility for examining banks that deal in municipal securities is vested in
the federal bank regulatory agencies. Enforcement authority lies with both the bank regulators and the SEC. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, §13, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 133-36.
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SEC prior to the entry of an order of investigation or the commencement of
any enforcement proceeding. Similarly, the SEC must consult with the appropriate regulatory agency before it may take such action. 9,5 It is clear from
the legislative history of the Securities Acts Amendments that the establishment of this regulatory scheme is a conscious attempt to accommodate the
conflicting interests of the SEC and the bank regulators. In its report the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs stated:
Bank dealers have a natural and competitive disinclination to be
subjected to an additional federal regulator, and bank regulatory
agencies have consistently opposed the regulation of banks through
quasi-governmental, self-regulatory associations. These agencies also urge
that any regulation of banks' municipal securities activities not be inconsistent with other bank regulation and that examination of banks by
persons other than the banking agencies be kept to a minimum. These
positions, of course, are in dramatic and historical contrast to those of
municipal securities firms and the [Securities and Exchange] Commission who desire to retain the present self-regulatory structure of the securities industry and to include the dealer banks within it. The Committee has evaluated these diverse positions and has endeavored on the
one hand to minimize any additional and unnecessary regulatory
burdens while on the other to reposit in the municipal securities industry itself maximum policymaking authority. 196
A similar self-regulatory apparatus would appear to be well suited as a
means for resolving the often conflicting demands of depositor security and
investor protection in the context of bank-sponsored investment services.
Establishing a rulemaking board composed of representatives from federal and
state bank regulatory agencies, the banking industry, and the SEC and vested
with authority over all banks and bank holding companies sponsoring investment services would insure that rules and examination procedures for enforcing the rules would be uniformily applied. The board would be free to
tailor rules to fit the particular needs of banks while, at the same time, providing increased protection to the investor. If the examination and enforcement functions were performed by the agencies currently responsible for such
functions and paid for by the regulated banks, the plan would entail no expensive and cumbersome addition to the federal bureaucracy.
CONCLUSION

The economic and regulatory milieu in which the banking industry operates today is qualitatively different from that of 1933. Extensive government
oversight has virtually eliminated the opportunity for the sort of speculative
abuse in securities dealing common before the passage of the Glass-Steagall
Act. Of course, conflicts of interest, some potentially dangerous, still exist in
the industry, as they do in other sectors of the nation's complex and interdependent financial community. Two alternative methods of dealing with these
195. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, §13, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 136.
196. S. Rm,. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1975).
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conflicts are prohibition and regulation. Because of a surge of public outrage,
the first method was embodied in the Glass-Steagall Act. In contrast, the
securities laws were based on the assumption that, given power to demand full
disclosure and punish fraudulent behavior, a federal regulatory agency could
prevent potential conflicts fr-om becoming actual abuses. The granting of broad
rulemaking and enforcement powers to the SEC has allowed that agency to
adapt pragmatically to new needs and new dangers as its experience dictated.
The regulation of bank-sponsored investment services likewise needs to be
made responsive to experience in a changing environment. The public interest
demands, not the a priori prohibition of any relationship susceptible of conflict, but rather the establishment of a mechanism for minimizing abuses while
maximizing the benefits to be gained from the availability of new and competitive investment vehicles.
JOHN M. WELCH, JR.
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